VZCZCXRO7991

OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC

DE RUEHC #1631/01 2731339

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O P 301320Z SEP 09

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 1324

RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 5698

INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY

RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4317

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7947

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 101631

## SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019

TAGS: OVIP SHANNON THOMAS PREL PGOV HO OAS

SUBJECT: A/S SHANNON,S SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING WITH HONDURAN

FOREIGN MINISTER PATRICIA RODAS

Classified By: WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

- $\P1$ . Classified by WHA A/S Thomas A. Shannon. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)
- (U) September 22, 2009; 15:00; New York, USA. <u>¶</u>2.
- <u>¶</u>3. (U) Participants:

WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon USUN Special Advisor Ron Godard Barbara Rocha (Notetaker)

## Honduras

Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas Vice President Aristides Mejia Ambassador Eduardo Enrique Reina Central Bank President Milton Jimenez Puerto Carlos Zelaya, brother of President Zelaya Hector Zelaya, son of President Zelaya

(C) SUMMARY. Honduran Foreign Minister Patricia Rodas expressed concern for the security of deposed present Manuel Zelaya and increasing repression in Honduras. She claimed to be unaware of Zelaya,s plans to return or details of how he entered the country. Rodas described this as a &moment of ultimatum8 during which international pressure could create a &bubble8 to guarantee Zelaya, s security and open space for negotiations. She detailed outreach efforts to get countries to denounce the de facto government during the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Rodas arranged for A/S Shannon to speak to Zelaya by phone about conditions at the Brazilian embassy. END SUMMARY.

Zelaya, s Return, Threat to Peace

- (C) Foreign Minister Rodas opened the meeting by expressing concern that the &golpistas8 were about to ask the Honduran Supreme Court for permission to violate the Vienna Convention and enter the Brazilian Embassy. She said the de facto government had already occupied adjacent buildings and repression was increasing.
- 16. (C) Rodas claimed to be unaware of Zelaya, s plans to return to Honduras. She said that they were scheduled to fly from Guatemala to New York for the UN General Assembly, but in Guatemala, she was separated from Zelaya and told he had &a private meeting.8 A few hours later, Zelaya called her from Tegucigalpa and asked her to tell President Colom that &he did not violate his borders.8 Rodas claimed to be unaware of the details of how Zelaya entered the country, but said his entry was well coordinated to maintain the peace.

17. (C) During the meeting, Rodas arranged for A/S Shannon to speak to Zelaya by phone. A/S Shannon asked Zelaya about conditions in the Brazilian embassy and told him that Ambassador Llorens was working to facilitate food, water and security. Zelaya reported that they had begun to receive food and water.

&Moment of Ultimatum8 for International Community

- 18. (C) Rodas said she was reaching out to regional groups (SICA, ALBA, Rio Group, etc.) and asking countries to denounce the de facto government during UNGA and issue a strong UN resolution on the matter. Rodas described this as a &moment of ultimatum8 during which international pressure is critical to create a &bubble8 to guarantee Zelaya,s security and open space for negotiations to resume. Rodas also said she was asking the international community to return ambassadors to Honduras.
- 19. (C) Rodas said that pressure from the United States is critical because &70 percent of the Honduran economy is in the United States.8 She expressed confidence that commercial, financial, and military pressure combined would drive the de facto government to the negotiating table. She warned that if de factos do not feel squeezed, they would

STATE 00101631 002 OF 002

just leave Zelaya trapped in the embassy until the November elections.

- 110. (C) Vice-President Aristides Mejia noted that military pressure was crucial because the de facto regime is entirely dependent on the military. He said most middle and lower level officers are against the &golpistas8 but are under tight control. He said the Zelaya camp is warning the military that the weight of events will ultimately rest on their shoulders, hoping this pressure will lead to fractures in the military. He added that SOUTHCOM has not pressured the military enough.
- 111. (C) A/S Shannon noted our statement calling on the de factos to guarantee the peace, sign the San Jose Accord, and respect the Vienna Convention. After Mejia mentioned that Zelaya planned to write to President Obama asking the United States to recognize what happened as a military coup, A/S Shannon noted that we have already applied all of the consequences associated with such recognition. CLINTON